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ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLICITUDE-JUDICIAL 
RESISTANCE TO REFORM OF MARRIED WOMEN'S 
PROPERTY LAW IN THE WEST 
SHERI ALLENt 
The evolution of the right of married women to own and control property in 
the western provinces was marked by an ongoing struggle between the legisla-
tures and the judiciary. The legislatures in each of the western provinces were 
prompt to grant property rights to married women in an effort to respond to 
social and economic change. However, the judiciary continued to limit the 
property women could own. This paper reviews the married women's prop-
erty legislation in British Columbia, the North-West Territories, Alberta, 
and Saskatchewan and examines the major cases defining separate property, 
the scope of liability of husbands and wives, and associated property issues. 
While successive statutes prescribed the incremental abolishment of the com-
mon law doctrine of marital unity, judges adhered to common law notions of 
family and steadfastly resisted giving full effect to these laws until the 1920s. 
L 'evolution du droit des femmes mariees de posseder et diriger la proprit!te 
dans !es provinces de l'ouest est caracterise par un combat entre les parlements 
et les juges. Les parlements de chacune des provinces n 'hesiterent pas a 
accorder les droits de proprit!te aux femmes mariees pour repondre aux 
changements sociaux et economiques. Cependant, les juges continuerent a 
limiter la propriete que les femmes pouvaient posseder. Cet article revoit les 
lois concernant la propriete des femmes mariees de la Colombie Britanique, 
de !'Alberta, des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, et de la Saskatchewan et 
examine les causes principaux qui dt!finissent l'idee de la propriete separie, 
l'itendue de la responsabilite des femmes et des maris, et d'autres questions 
liees aux droits de la propriete. Bien que des lois successives aient commence 
!'abolition du principe de !'unite des epoux, les juges ne laisserent pas les 
notions du droit commun concernant la famille et refuserent fortement 
jusqu 'aux annees 1920 a realiser completement !es buts de ces lois. 
t B.A. (Victoria), LL.B. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie). 
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The western provinces have enjoyed a reputation as pioneers of so-
cial reform in Canada, and it is logical to assume that this progres-
sive attitude would also be manifested in the judicial and legislative 
approach to reforming the property rights of married women. 
Indeed, one might think that the valuable role pioneer women 
played in the prairie provinces would have justified reform of prop-
erty laws sooner than in the rest of the country. It is true that in 
some respects, the women of British Columbia, Alberta, and 
Saskatchewan secured legal rights more rapidly than did women in 
central Canada and the Maritimes. Political equality, for example, 
was won by women in the West at an early date; as far back as 1873 
both married and single women in what is now British Columbia 
had a vote in municipal affairs, 1 and Alberta and Saskatchewan were 
two of the first provinces to grant women the right to vote in 
provincial elections.2 
However, despite relatively early legislative efforts to reform 
married women's property rights, substantive change did not come 
quickly or easily in the West. This paper provides an overview of the 
evolution of married women's property reform in the provinces of 
British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, and charts the 
changes which took place. The factors which motivated legislatures 
to institute incremental change in the statutory law are identified, 
as well as those factors which galvanized the judiciary in all three 
provinces against giving effect to the legislation. 
In documenting married women's property reform, most his-
torians proceed upon the assumption that the common law doctrine 
of marital unity imposed extreme hardships on nineteenth-century 
women. Married women's property laws are said to have reduced 
women to a state of "virtual slavery,'' putting women in the same 
category with criminals, lunatics, and minors as being legally in-
competent and irresponsible.3 It is true that the common law did 
have negative effects, including bringing about extreme hardship 
for deserted women and presenting often insurmountable barriers 
1 C. Cleverdon, The Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 87. 
2 This right was granted in 1916; British Columbia & Ontario followed suit the 
following year. S. Altschul & C. Carron, "Chronology of Some Legal Landmarks 
in the History of Canadian Women" (1975) 21 McGill L.J. 476 at 480. 
3 L. Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Womens Property 
Law in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) 
at 36. 
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to participation in commercial activities. However, analysis of mar-
ried women's property reform is hampered by a twentieth-century 
aversion to the very notion of marital unity, in which "husband and 
wife are one person, and the husband is that person."4 As a result, it 
is generally assumed that the gradual recognition of the injustices 
occasioned by the common law necessitated and motivated the re-
form of married women's property law. 
However, this approach has recently been challenged. Historians 
have suggested that in fact, the common law doctrine of marital 
unity continued to regulate domestic relations in some Canadian 
jurisdictions as effectively as it had in medieval times. The common 
law was based upon the notion that the family was a "community," 
and some have argued that the responsibilities owed by a husband 
to his wife tempered the loss of legal rights which women suffered 
upon marriage.5 These scholars caution against presuming that de-
fects in the common law were obvious at the time and that this 
sentiment fuelled the reform of married women's property laws. 
It is as yet unclear whether there was general dissatisfaction 
among women in the western provinces about the ability of the 
common law to govern marital affairs. Determining whether the 
common law regime was acceptable to women and whether the in-
troduction of separate property rights resulted in a net improve-
ment in the quality of their lives is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, by necessity, this analysis is largely confined to sources cre-
ated by formal legal institutions. What is clear from the following 
analysis is that the opinion of the judiciary on the merits of the 
common law was very different from that of the provincial legisla-
tures, and that this disagreement determined the responses of these 
institutions to social and legal change. 
An examination of the common law rules regarding married 
women's property is necessary in order to assess subsequent legisla-
tive developments and judicial interpretations. Norma Basch sum-
marizes the common law conception of marriage this way: 
The husband adopts his wife together with her assets and 
liabilities. Taking responsibility for her maintenance and 
4 This expression is generally ascribed to the eighteenth-century jurist Sir 
William Blackstone. 
5 P. Girard & R. Veinott, "Married Women's Property Law in Nova Scotia, 
1850-1910" in]. Guildford & S. Morton, eds., Separate Spheres: Womens Worlds 
in the 19th Century Maritimes (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1994) at 67. 
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protection, he enjoys her property and the products of 
her labor. The wife assumes her husband's name and by 
extension his rank in the social order. Giving up her own 
surname and coming under his wing or protective cover, 
she acquires a cloak of legal invisibility. Her legal person-
ality is submerged in her husband's. With their identities 
fused and their assets combined, the husband and wife 
are in an incomparable position to produce legitimate 
heirs, thereby fulfilling the true function of marriage. 6 
At common law, all personal property owned by a woman at 
the time of marriage and all that she acquired thereafter became her 
husband's absolutely, with the exception of the wife's clothing and 
personal ornaments. He could use and dispose of this property in 
any way during his lifetime, including bequeathing it by will, with-
out his wife's consent. A married woman did not lose ownership 
rights over real estate, but her husband gained the authority to 
manage the property and receive the rents and profits from it. On 
the death of her husband, a woman was entitled to the use of one-
third of the lands and tenements her husband had possessed during 
marriage as a tenant in dower. If a husband survived his wife, her 
property passed to her heirs at law, subject to her husband's right to 
hold her land as a tenant by curtesy if the wife had at least one sur-
viving child. 
As a corollary to the limitations placed upon women, husbands 
were burdened with considerable responsibilities. Since a woman's 
legal existence was incorporated into that of her husband, in prac-
tice he acted as her legal representative.7 He assumed legal respon-
sibility for all actions involving his wife, including recovering any 
money owed to her, paying any debts she had incurred, and paying 
damages for her torts or breaches of contract. In these actions the 
husband could be sued alone or jointly with his wife and was liable 
to the full extent of his own property. 
The doctrine of marital unity restricted not only the property 
rights of married women, but also their legal rights. Married 
women were legally incapable of suing or of being sued in their own 
names. A married woman could not enter into contracts in her own 
name because she had no property with which to satisfy her debts, 
6 N. Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-
Century New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982) at 53-54. 
7 Holcombe, supra note 3 at 25-26. 
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although from the fifteenth century a married woman could enter 
into contracts in her husband's name as his agent where she had his 
express or implied consent. A husband could escape responsibility 
for these contracts by rebutting the presumption of agency.a 
Women could engage in business separately from their husbands, 
but only if they had his consent to do so.9 As well, since the hus-
band and wife were considered one person at law, they could not 
contract with each other, sue each other in tort, nor give gifts to one 
another. 
In England, a body of equitable principles had evolved to re-
spond to the omissions and injustices of the common law. Although 
also based upon the assumption that married women needed pro-
tection, equity provided a useful mechanism to protect property 
from one's husband by allowing property to be conveyed to a mar-
ried woman's separate use. The principles of equity are generally 
thought to have had little effect on married women's property 
rights in Canada, 10 although there is some indication that marriage 
settlements were used in Nova Scotia. 11 In any case, it was this 
mechanism of owning property to one's "separate use" which the 
late nineteenth-century married women's property legislation 
attempted to make available to the general population of married 
women. 
I. BRITISH COLUMBIA 
1. Married Women's Property Legislation in British Columbia 
The government of present-day British Columbia first addressed 
the issue of the property rights of married women in 1862. The 
colony of Vancouver Island, then a thirteen-year old member of the 
British empire, passed An Act to Protect the Property of a Wife 
8 Holcombe, supra note 3 at 27. 
9 C. Backhouse, "Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century 
Canada" (1988) 6 Law and History Review 211 at 213. 
10 M. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958) at 215. 
11 Girard & Veinott, supra note 5 at 73. A "marriage settlement" was an ante-
nuptial or post-nuptial trust in which nominal ownership was conveyed to a trustee 
who managed the property for the benefit of the married woman: see Backhouse, 
supra note 9 at 215. 
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Deserted by her Husband 12 very early in comparison to many 
provinces. This period is described as the first wave of reform in 
which most Canadian jurisdictions created legislation to deal with 
emergency situations of marital breakdown. The legislators in New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had enacted similar statutes 
by 1862, but Ontario and Nova Scotia had not yet taken such 
steps. 13 
The act was clearly designed to protect married women rather 
than extend greater property rights to them. The preamble states 
that the "expediency" of protecting the property of deserted 
women was the motivating factor behind the legislation. Modelled 
after the British Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 14 the statute en-
abled a married woman to apply to the authorities upon desertion 
for an order to protect her future earnings and property from her 
husband and his creditors. Thereafter, the property and earnings 
would belong to her as though she were a fame sole. 
Although it is obvious that protection was the focus of the act, it 
is not clear what induced the colonial government to turn their at-
tention from building roads and raising capital to the plight of 
women so promptly. Constance Backhouse has speculated that the 
legislation was passed in reaction to the collapse in the economy 
and consequent decreasing population of Victoria which followed 
the rapid growth during the gold rush. 15 In fact, the Act to Protect 
Deserted Wives was passed in a year of great optimism and eco-
nomic activity. The Fraser River gold mines were still thriving in 
1862, and Governor James Douglas was preoccupied with accumu-
lating money to build the Great Northern Road to improve access 
12 An Act to Protect the Property of a Wife Deserted by her Husband; Public 
General statutes of the colony of Vancouver Island 1859-1863, 26 Viet. (1862) No. 
9. 
13 However, there had been attempts to do so in Nova Scotia. The earliest 
example is an unsuccessful bill introduced in the Nova Scotia legislature in 1855, 
which sought not only to protect deserted women, but also proposed improved 
property rights to protect married women from economic insecurity. Nova Scotia 
eventually enacted a first-wave style statute in 1866. See P. Girard, "Married 
Women's Property, Chancery Abolition, and Insolvency Law: Law Reform in Nova 
Scotia 1820-1867" in P. Girard & J. Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of 
Canadian Law: Vol III, Nova Scotia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 
80 at 85-86. 
I4 Matrimonial Causes Act (U.K.), 20 & 21 Viet. (1857), c. 85. 
l5 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 218-219. 
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to them. 16 It appears more likely therefore that the women about 
whom Douglas and his parliament were concerned had been aban-
doned during the gold rush rather than after it, since many men 
used Victoria as a home base, leaving their families behind and go-
ing off to seek their fortunes.17 
It should be noted that Victoria was not a typical North 
American frontier settlement, where pioneers struggled against a 
harsh environment. It was in fact a place of leisure and sophistica-
tion, referred to as "a second England on the shores of the 
Pacific." 18 The Governor's officials and the men who made up the 
Legislative Council were aristocratic, wealthy landowners of British 
origin, in contrast to the rougher and more adventurous lot who 
sought riches in the Cariboo. Presumably these gentlemen were 
motivated by a chivalrous desire to protect the women left behind 
by fortune seekers, and for this reason were inclined to follow 
England's legislative lead. 
The impact of the legislation is difficult to assess. It has been 
suggested elsewhere that this type of legislation would have only af-
fected a small number of women, since availing oneself of the statu-
tory protection required obtaining a court order. 19 Moreover, the 
act required that the authority in question be satisfied that the 
woman was truly deserted, that she was maintaining herself by her 
own industry or property, and that the desertion was without rea-
sonable cause. It is perhaps noteworthy that women's economic sta-
tus appeared to be improving in the late 1870s, but it is unclear 
whether married women benefited from these advances.20 Whether 
a significant number of women applied for orders under the Act 
would more accurately indicate the effect of the legislation, but this 
research has not been undertaken. 
16 Ormsby, supra note 10 at 188. 
17 J. Gould, Women of British Columbia (Saanichton, British Columbia: 
Hancock House, 1975) at 91. 
18 Ormsby, supra note 10 at 257. 
l9 Girard & Veinott, supra note 5 at 75. 
20 Women's participation in the land market marginally increased between 1863 
and 1871. In 1863, only four percent of property holders were women; but eight 
years later, that number had increased to 7 percent. See P. Baskerville, She Has 
Already Hinted at "Board": Enterprising Urban Women in British Columbia 
1863-1896 (Faculty ofB.C. Studies, University of Victoria, 1992) [unpublished] at 
7. 
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The two colonies of Vancouver Island and New Westminster 
became the province of British Columbia and entered the 
Dominion of Canada on July 19, 1871. Joining Confederation 
brought responsible government, and, much more popular at the 
time, the promise of a railway link to the rest of Canada. Within 
two years of joining Canada, the Legislative Assembly in Victoria 
passed legislation which allowed married women to own real estate 
and to transact business on the basis of that ownership free from 
control by their husbands. 21 The legislators turned from Britain as a 
guide and instead copied Ontario's Married Womens Property Act 
of 187222 almost verbatim. The purpose of the legislation was no 
longer merely to respond to marriage breakdown and can be said to 
fall into the third, "egalitarian" wave of married women's property 
reform. Third-wave statutes generally granted women the right to 
dispose of their real and personal property, to control their own 
wages, and to contract, sue, and conduct business.23 
The 1873 statute provided that all wages and earnings, and all 
profits from an occupation or trade carried on separately from one's 
husband were deemed to be a married woman's own property as 
fully as if she were a fame sole. 24 In addition, a married woman 
gained the abilities enjoyed by a fame sole to insure her own life (or 
that of her husband with his consent), to become a stockholder or 
voting member of an incorporated company, to make deposits in 
her own name in a bank, and to sue and be sued. 25 Married women 
also became legally capable of contracting upon, and enjoying to 
separate use, real estate acquired in any manner before or during 
marriage, as fully as afame sole. 26 It was not until an amendment in 
1887 that personal property could also be held to separate use.27 
21 An Act to Extend the Rights of Property of Married Women, 36 Viet. (1873), 
e. 29 (B.C.) [hereinafter Rights of Property of Married Women Act 1873]. An Act to 
amend and consolidate the Laws respecting the North-West Territories Act, 38 Viet. 
(1875), c. 49, ss. 48-53 [hereinafter North-West Territories Act 1875] was based 
upon this statute. 
22 An Act to Extend the Rights of Property of Married Women, 35 Viet. (1871-72), 
c. 16 (Ont .. ). 
23 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 230-231. 
24 Rights of Property of Married Women Act 1873, s. 2. 
25 Supra note 24, ss. 3, 5, 6, 8. 
26 Supra note 24, s. l. 
27 Married Women's Property Act, S.B.C. 50 Viet. (1887), c. 20 [hereinafter 
Married Women's Property Act 1887]. 
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The Married Women's Property Act 1887 abrogated the com-
mon law rule that husbands be held liable for their wives' ante-nup-
tial debts, post-nuptial contracts, and those post-nuptial debts aris-
ing through their wives' employment or business. 28 Instead, a 
married woman was liable for her own separate ante-nuptial debts, 
torts, and contracts, with property belonging to her for her separate 
use available to satisfy her liabilities. By relieving husbands from li-
ability, the statute dealt a potentially substantial blow to the doc-
trine of marital unity, extinguishing the husband's traditional role 
as legal representative of the marital unit. 
What compelled the Legislative Assembly to grant these signifi-
cant property and legal rights to women in 1873? Constance 
Backhouse has hypothesized that in Ontario, the third-wave statutes 
were a response both to "the recalcitrant behaviour of Canadian 
judges, who had robbed earlier statutes of much of their reform po-
tential," and to the economic and legal impasse that had been cre-
ated by judicial rulings, since no one knew who had the absolute 
dispositive control over married women's property.29 Regularizing 
credit relations in a modernizing economy required clarification of 
the law regarding married women's property. 
This theory is borne out by the events taking place in British 
Columbia at this time. Economically, the 1870s were a time of de-
pression and diversification in British Columbia. The Cariboo gold 
rush was over, and other sources of wealth and employment were 
being developed, including agriculture, coal mining, salmon pack-
ing, and lumber exporting. 30 A great deal of the law in colonial 
British Columbia at this time concerned bankruptcy and small 
debts. As one historian has noted, the colony's high-risk, credit-
based economy resulted in a need for efficiency and order in busi-
ness as well as social relations.31 
In other Canadian jurisdictions there was a suggested link be-
tween an emerging female suffrage movement and the expansion of 
28 Supra note 27, s. 7. 
29 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 231. 
30 F. W. Howay, "The Settlement and Progress of British Columbia, 1871-
1914" in J. Friesen & H. K. Ralston, eds., Historical Essays on British Columbia 
(Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) 23 at 23. 
31 H. Foster, English Law, British Columbia: Establishing Legal Institutions West 
of the Rockies (Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, 1992) [unpublished] at 36. 
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married women's property rights.32 There is some indication that 
the issue of female political rights was surfacing in British Columbia 
in the early 1870s, but the notion of extending the vote to women 
was still unpopular with the legislators. In fact, a bill for women's 
suffrage introduced in the legislature in 1872 had the support of 
only two members.33 
Regardless of what the motivation may have been in enacting 
the statute, it is unlikely that it changed the legal status of British 
Columbian women in any material way. Although there are no re-
ported cases in that province, the Ontario judiciaty's interpretation 
of identical provisions indicates that the British Columbia statute 
probably had very little positive impact. Ontario judges rarely 
found that goods or real estate belonged to a married woman, and 
in those cases where the facts clearly demanded acknowledgment 
of ownership, the Ontario judiciary consistently refused to construe 
the statute in a manner that would grant women an absolute power 
of disposition.34 The fact that the statute stated quite clearly that 
this was the legislative intent did not divert judges in Ontario from 
their path of adherence to the pre-existing common law. 
The judges in Ontario also ensured that the assets of married 
women continued to be immune from claims by applying the 
English rule that a woman could not make a binding contract unless 
she had separate property, and there is some indication that this 
"separate estate rule" was also applied in British Columbia.35 Before 
a creditor could recover against a married woman, it was necessary 
to show that at the time the contract was made she had a separate 
estate, and that at the time the action was tried, she still had the 
same separate estate. The separate estate rule was another example 
of a rationale used to avoid the clear legislative intent that women 
32 See for example Girard and Veinott, supra note 5 at 82-88; Backhouse, supra 
note 9 at 223. 
33 Daily Colonist (23 June 1872) 2. 
34 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 233. 
35 Reference to the separate estate rule was made in Mylius v. Jackson (1894), 3 
B.C.R. 149 (S.C.T.D.), rev'd (1894), 23 S.C.R. 485. The defendant Margaret 
Jackson raised the separate estate rule in defence to a creditor's claim against her. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal noted that the point had been raised at the 
Appeal level but would not consider it because it had not been raised in the 
pleadings or in the Court below, but the dissenting Judge would have set the 
judgement against Margaret Jackson aside on the basis of the rule. 
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would be liable to be sued separately from their husbands as if they 
were unmarried. 
The propensity of the courts to avoid holding married women 
liable for their debts was a blow to their legal status, making it vir-
tually impossible for married women to get personal credit or 
transact many types of business on their own.36 This protection was 
fortified by an amendment in 188337 which expanded the liability 
of husbands. The 1883 legislation repealed the provisions in the 
1873 Act and deemed that husband and wife could once again be 
jointly sued for the wife's separate ante-nuptial debts, torts, and 
contracts, as well as post-nuptial torts. 38 However, the Act was not a 
full-scale return to the common law. Section 5 of the Act provided 
that the husband would only be liable to the extent of the value of 
assets and property he had received from his wife by way of 
marriage. This included, for example, the wife's personal estate 
which had vested in the husband, profits the husband had received 
from his wife's real estate, and the wife's chattels which had vested 
in husband and wife. 
The preamble reveals that rationalizing the laws of debtor-
creditor39 relations was the driving force behind the 1883 legisla-
tion: 
Whereas it is not just that the property which a woman 
has at the time of her marriage should pass to her hus-
band, and that he should not be liable for her debts con -
tracted before marriage, and the law as to the recovery of 
such debts requires amendment .... 
In fact, although there are no reported cases from the 1880s in 
British Columbia, the majority of the Ontario cases decided during 
this period were launched not by women, but by creditors. Credit 
companies in British Columbia were becoming more powerful as a 
result of increasing economic modernization and industrialization. 
The province enjoyed a boom in the 1880s as the long-awaited con-
struction of the railway on the mainland and Vancouver Island be-
36 The effect of continuing protection of women from liability in British 
Columbia has not been reviewed. However, the New York position is assessed in 
detail in Basch, supra note 6 at 215. 
37 An Act to amend the Married Womens Property Act 1873, S.B.C. 46 Viet. 
(1883), c. 18 [hereinafter Married Womens Property Act 1883]. 
38 Ibid. s. 1. 
39 This theme is discussed in Girard and Veinott, supra note 5 at 81-82. 
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gan. The population doubled in this decade, with families of new-
comers arriving where individuals had come before.40 As a result, 
agricultural land in the province was being occupied and cultivated, 
and land values increased sixfold.41 The Victoria government's 
sympathy for the concerns of creditors can perhaps be explained by 
the fact that the legislators continued to be drawn from the elite 
class, and were primarily merchants, lawyers, industrialists and 
landed proprietors who had prospered during the days of railway 
construction. 42 
The modernization of the province also had an effect on atti-
tudes toward the role of women, who became increasingly involved 
in non-traditional occupations and businesses and began to agitate 
for legal and political rights. Although the women's rights move-
ment in British Columbia did not become powerful until the early 
1900s, there are frequent reports of attempts by British Columbian 
women to secure suffrage and other rights in the 1880s. For exam-
ple, the first suffrage petition was presented to the Premier of 
British Columbia in Victoria in 1883.43 The combination of the 
growing power of the credit institutions and the changing attitudes 
toward the appropriate role of women may have been the impetus 
for the 1883 legislation. 
The next legislative event was the Married Womens Property 
Act 1887, 44 the chief feature of which was the addition of personal 
property to the types of property women could hold to their sepa-
rate use. Continuing the practice of borrowing from the central 
Canadian model, the statute was a close copy of the 1884 Ontario 
legislation. The similarity of the statutes leads one to conclude that 
the Act was merely another step in a continuing policy of following 
Ontario's legislative developments to address the needs brought 
about by British Columbia's economic modernization. 
40 In 1881, the population of British Columbia was 49,459, an increase of 13,000 
since 1871: Howay, supra note 30 at 27. 
41 Baskerville, supra note 20 at 5-6. 
42 Ormsby, supra note 10 at 304. 
43 Michael H. Cramer, "Public and Political: Documents of the Woman's 
Suffrage Campaign in British Columbia, 1871-1917" in Barbara Latham & Cathy 
Kess, eds., In Her Own Right: Selected Essays on Women's History in B. C. (Victoria: 
Camosun College, 1980) 79 at 80. 
44 Supra note 27. 
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The Ontario Act Respecting the Property of Married Women 
188445 is considered to have been a response to the continuing ju-
dicial refusal to give effect to that province's existing legislation. 46 
As did the Ontario Act, the British Columbian statute explicitly 
stated that married women were capable of acquiring, holding, and 
disposing of both real and personal property acquired before or af-
ter marriage as separate property, in the same manner as a fame sole, 
without the intervention of a trustee. The legislation continued to 
define personal property as it had been defined in the 1873 
statute,47 and husbands continued to be liable for the pre-nuptial 
liabilities of their wives. As under the 1883 amendment, husbands 
were only liable to the extent that they benefited from the receipt 
of property from their wives upon marriage. After marriage, a hus-
band was liable for his wife's torts, but his wife was fully responsible 
for her post-nuptial debts and breaches of contract. Only if the 
plaintiff sought to establish the claim against both of them could 
husbands and wives be jointly sued for ante-nuptial liabilities other 
than torts.48 
Despite the incremental strengthening of the statutory rights 
and liabilities of married women, it appears that their actual credit-
obtaining capacity continued to be restricted in the late nineteenth 
century. An example is Margarette Boechofsky, a married woman 
in British Columbia who applied for a loan in 1892 in order to buy 
a home. Although Mrs. Boechofsky offered security appraised at 
three times the value of the loan and although the property and 
house were very desirable, the general manager of the credit com-
pany declined the loan on the basis that her husband had an unde-
sirable credit rating.49 This example indicates that women contin-
ued to be viewed as an extension of their husbands, just as they had 
been at common law. 
45 An Act Respecting the Property of Married Women, S.O. 47 Viet. (1884), c. 19 
(Ont.). 
46 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 235-236. 
47 Section 3 of the Married Womens Property Act 1873 provided that separate 
property included "any wages, earnings, money, and property gained or acquired by 
her in any employment, trade, or occupation in which she is engaged, or which she 
carries on separately from her husband, or by the exercise of any literary, artistic, or 
scientific skill." 
48 Married Womens Property Act 1887, ss. 13-15. 
49 Baskerville, supra note 20 at 18. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in 1892 that the 
equivalent Ontario legislation had brought about significant change 
and had rendered married women able to enjoy and dispose of 
their real estate.5° Despite this ruling, courts in Ontario continued 
to restrict the effect of the Act by adhering to the separate estate 
rule described above, necessitating legislation in 1897 which explic-
itly renounced the rule.5 1 
Apparently, a similar concern motivated the legislators in British 
Columbia to review the Married Womens Property Act in the same 
year.52 A provision from a British statute which had also been bor-
rowed by the Ontario legislation was adopted.53 This provision 
clearly renounced the separate property rule, stating that every con-
tract entered into by a married woman bound all her present and 
future separate property, even if she ceased to be a married woman, 
whether or not she had any separate property at the time of enter-
ing the contract. 
The choice to adopt an imperial model may have been an at-
tempt to ensure that the provision would be passed in the 
Legislature. As Philip Girard and Rebecca Veinott have noted, in 
the late Victorian era, "the easiest way to ensure assent to a piece of 
legislation was to suggest that it was modeled so closely on the rele-
vant English act that any difficulties in its interpretation could be 
eased by reference to the English cases decided under it."54 The 
return to imperial models may also have been a result of the increas-
ing professionalism of the bar and admiration for the English bar 
and judiciary.55 
2. Judicial Interpretation in the Early Twentieth Century 
The early 1900s was a time of rapid change. Women entered the 
work force in ever greater numbers in response to robust economic 
growth. As well, the suffrage movement was gaining strength, and 
it is likely that this activism had a significant impact upon social at-
5o Moorev.jackson (1892), 22 S.C.R. 210 at 223. 
51 Backhouse, supra note 9 at 236. 
52 Married Womens Property Act, R.S.B.C. 1897, c. 130 [hereinafter Married 
Womens Property Act, 1897]. 
53 An Act to amend the Married Womens Property Act 1882 (U.K.), 56 & 57 Viet. 
(1893) c. 63, s. 1. 
54 Supra note 5 at 89. 
55 Ibid. at 89. 
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titudes about not only the political status of women but also their 
other legal rights. Many historians have concluded that the suffrage 
movement was motivated less by a sense of political injustice than 
by a desire to improve inequitable legislation, and to ameliorate 
women's legal status vis-a-vis the family.56 For example, the Political 
Equality Action League, founded in 1910, rationalized the suffrage 
movement this way: "As a matter of indisputable fact ... politics 
have invaded the home, and women, if they would defend and 
safeguard their homes, must invade politics."57 
Voting rights were won in British Columbia in 1916, and 
women soon began to participate in politics. Legislation addressing 
issues of concern to women such as female minimum wages, moth-
er's pensions, and deserted wives were put in place in the 1920s, and 
British Columbia boasted that it was the national leader in social 
legislation.58 
In this context, the continuing judicial restrictions on the prop-
erty rights of married women must have appeared, even to the ju-
diciary, to be increasingly anomalous. Three main issues arose in the 
interpretation of the married women's property legislation between 
1897 and the mid-1920s: the scope of a married woman's separate 
property, the degree of her ability to control it, and the extent to 
which her husband remained liable for her debts.59 Case law in these 
areas reveals a gradual but inexorable acceptance of the changing 
status of married women. 
i. The Right to Own Property and Extent of Liability of Married 
Women in British Columbia 
There are only two reported British Columbia cases in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries that directly consider the rights 
56 E.g. C. L. Bacchi, Liberation Deferred? The Ideas of the English Canadian 
Suffragists, 1877-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) at 12. 
57 D. M. Davis & M. Gordon Grant, eds., The Champion, The Political Equity 
League, Newsletter, in vol. 2 Qanuary-April 1914, cited in Cramer, Supra note 43 
at 86. 
53 E. Norcross, "Mary Ellen Smith: The right woman in the right place at the 
right time" in B. K. Latham & R. J. Pazdro, eds., Not just Pin Money: selected essays 
on the History of Womens Work in British Columbia (Victoria: Camosun College, 
1984) at 362. 
59 The next legislation passed was the Married Womens Property Act, R.S.B.C. 
1911, c. 152 [hereinafter Married Womens Property Act 1911], which was identical 
to the Married Womens Property Act of 1897, supra note 52. 
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and liabilities of married women. The first, decided in 1923, 60 
concerned the ownership of household goods seized by a creditor 
from a home jointly occupied by a husband and wife. At common 
law, goods seized from a jointly occupied home would be prima fa-
ci e subject to seizure under execution against the husband. 
However, following English authority, the Married Women's 
Property Act was held to render a husband and wife "two persons 
just as if they were two men,"61 and therefore the common law 
presumption no longer applied. As a result, the court accepted the 
statements of the couple that the husband had given the goods to 
his wife as a precondition to her promising to marry him, despite 
the fact that there was nothing in writing to prove this transaction 
had taken place. 
In one unusual case decided in 1920,62 the court had occasion to 
flatly reject the common law principle that the husband and wife 
became one legal entity upon marriage. The plaintiff, Mrs. Hawks, 
claimed she had a right to land bought by her husband. The prop-
erty in question was Crown land that the husband had put in her 
name, because he had exhausted his own right of requirement. Mrs. 
Hawks claimed rights to the land relying upon the doctrine of 
marital unity. Since husband and wife are one, she reasoned, her 
husband's property was also hers. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected this submission 
and found Mr. Hawks to be the true owner; Mrs. Hawks was 
deemed to have merely held the land for her husband in trust. In 
hindsight, it is ironic that after decades of Canadian decisions 
which enforced creditors' claims against the husbands of female 
property owners merely on the basis of their marriage, the Court 
would have no doubts about refusing a married woman's claim to 
an interest in this property, which was in the wife's name, on the 
same basis. 
ii. The Scope of Separate Property 
Aside from the barriers to recognition of women's rights and liabil-
ities with respect to their property, women were hard-pressed to 
convince the courts that assets belonged to them at all. Burdens of 
proof were resurrected from the common law and consistently 
6o Northv. Siciliano eta!., [1923] l W.W.R. 551 (B.C. S.C.T.D.). 
61 Ibid at 552. 
62 Hawks v. Hawks (1920), 29 B.C.R. 64 (B.C.C.A.). 
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placed upon the women who attempted to avail themselves of the 
legislation. An example is Dudgeon v. Dudgeon and Parsons, decided 
in 1907. 63 According to the findings of fact, Mr. and Mrs. 
Dudgeon had planned to buy a piece of property together, but the 
deed was made out in the name of the wife. They built a small 
house, paid for by Mr. Dudgeon, which Mrs. Dudgeon subse-
quently sold to the other defendant without the consent of her hus-
band. 
Mr. Dudgeon launched an action against his wife and the pur-
chaser, claiming that the house belonged to him because he had ad-
vanced the entire $600 purchase money and that his wife was 
merely his trustee. Mrs. Dudgeon claimed that her husband had 
only given her part of the purchase money, that this money was a 
gift, and that she had supplemented it with money of her own re-
ceived from her father and other sources to buy the land for herself. 
The Court noted that at common law, there is a presumption 
that conveyances made to one's wife are by way of advancement, 
and therefore the husband had the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption with evidence showing such a gift was not made. Despite 
this requirement, the Trial Judge decided that Mrs. Dudgeon's ar-
gument that the couple's intention was that the property be hers ab-
solutely, and that she should be in a position to sell it without re-
gard to his wishes, "went too far." 64 Although the Judge found it 
not at all unlikely that some of her money was used for the pur-
chase, her claim to absolute rights to the property rendered her evi-
dence so unreliable that he could not accept it. The Judge therefore 
presumed that the money belonged to the husband, and that it was 
intended that the house be held by her in trust for her husband and 
his family. Clearly, the evidentiary hurdles a married woman had 
to overcome in order to convince the courts that property belonged 
to her were very high indeed. 
Canary v. Cohn,65 decided in 1925, was one rare example of a 
case in which a married woman launched an action against a judg-
ment creditor and sought to enforce her statutory rights. Nellie 
Cohn, who was an equal business partner with her husband, sued an 
63 Dudgeon v. Dudgeon and Parsons (1907), 6 W.L.R. 346 (S.C.T.D.) 
[hereinafter Dudgeon]. 
64 Jbid at 352. 
65 Canaryv. Cohn (1925), 35 B.C.R. 478 (S.C.T.D.). 
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execution creditor for household furniture, a car, a phonograph, 
and a piano which had been seized to satisfy her husband's debts. 
The Trial Judge was pressed to clarify the meaning of the am-
biguous definition of separate property which had first been intro-
duced in 1873 as "any wages, earnings, money, and property 
gained or acquired by her in any employment, trade, or occupation 
in which she is engaged, or which she carries on separately from her 
husband. "66 As will be discussed below, the task of interpreting 
similar provisions had arisen earlier and more often in the prairie 
jurisdictions than in British Columbia, since in those provinces crops 
from land owned by married women were often seized by the hus-
band's execution creditors. 
The defendant argued that the "or" in the provision implied 
that a married woman's separate property did not include earnings 
acquired in partnership with her husband. However, the Court de-
cided that "separate property" included any earnings acquired in 
any employment, regardless of whether it was carried on separately 
from one's husband. Therefore, since Mrs. Cohn's uncontested tes-
timony was that the furniture and phonograph were purchased us-
ing money from her wages in this business, the Court held that they 
belonged to her. No authority was cited to justify this radical de-
parture from the common judicial approach, instead, the judge 
merely stated that based on a plain understanding, he was "unable 
to read any other meaning into the words used in the statute."67 
The approach to determining the owner of the car in question 
was also progressive. The car was purchased under a conditional 
agreement signed by both the plaintiff and her husband, but the ac-
tual sale was made to the plaintiff. Although Nellie Cohn made the 
cash payment, signed promissory notes for the deferred payments, 
and had the license and insurance policy in her name, her husband 
paid the installments. Mrs. Cohn argued that these payments were 
made under an agreement with her husband to repay her for a pre-
vious loan. Although courts had traditionally refused to recognize 
any debtor-creditor arrangements between husband and wife on 
the basis of the doctrine of marital unity, the court in this case held 
that the car was her property. 
Clearly by 1925 the British Columbia judiciary had greatly ex-
panded the scope of separate property from the position in the 
66 Married Womens Property Act 1911, supra note 59, s. 7. 
67 Supra note 65 at 479. 
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1907 case of Dudgeon above, where a woman's testimony that she 
bought a house with her own money and with money she acquired 
by gift from her husband did not convince the Court that the house 
belonged to her. The Trial Judge's willingness to give effect to the 
plain meaning of the statute in Canary v. Cohn was a radical change 
from the approach taken in the past, a shift which can perhaps be 
explained by a judicial acknowledgment of the significant social 
changes taking place in the early twentieth century. 
iii. The Liability of Husbands 
The judiciary resisted interpreting the married women's property 
legislation in a way which would support an economic or contrac-
tual view of marriage. In Re Sea, 68 decided in 1905, the husband of 
a woman who died intestate was appointed administrator and 
sought to charge the burying expenses against her estate. Justice 
Duff (as he then was) declined to follow American authority and 
held that even though the Married Womans Property Act 1897 re-
duced the jus mariti, it did not affect marriage status nor the hus-
band's duty to bury his dead wife. This "last act of piety and char-
ity" was said to be an obligation founded in the marriage relation-
ship itself. 
In addition, the judiciary continued in the early twentieth cen-
tury to maintain that the purpose of the married women's property 
legislation was to "relieve" and protect wives. Under the statute, a 
husband continued to be liable for his wife's ante-nuptial debts, 
contracts and torts, and post-nuptial torts, to the extent of property 
acquired from his wife under the marriage.69 The separate property 
of married women was liable to satisfy all of these obligations, as 
well as any damages or costs recovered against her in any pro-
ceeding.70 However, reluctance to enforce liability against married 
women was illustrated by the decision in 1901 that a husband was 
not only jointly liable for damages arising from the torts of his wife, 
but was also liable for costs in any such action, on the basis that the 
act was not intended to protect husbands.71 
However, by 1919 the judiciary was less wedded to notions of 
protection and marital unity than it had been at the turn of the cen-
6S Re Sea (1905) 1W.L.R.460 (Chambers). 
69 Married Womens Property Act 1911, supra note 59, s. 31. 
70 Married Womens Property Act 1911, supra note 59, s. 5. 
71 MacKenziev. Cunningham & Wife (1901), 8 B.C.R. 206 at 207 (S.C.T.D.). 
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tury. In that year, a married woman sued the British Columbia 
Electric Railway Company for personal injuries sustained in an ac-
cident in which her husband was driving their car and hit a train. 
The husband was found contributorily negligent. At common law, 
this would have been lethal to her claim; the fact that a husband was 
a necessary party to an action for injuries to his wife and was enti-
tled to the damages recovered would have made his contributory 
negligence a bar to recovery. The Court of Appeal held that in this 
circumstance the common law doctrine of marital unity was ren-
dered non-existent by the Married Women's Property Act 1911, and 
the wife had the right to sue the Company as would a fame sole. 72 
iv. British Columbia Case Law: Conclusion 
By the mid 1920s, the common law doctrine of marital unity had 
been truly laid to rest in British Columbia. Property seized from a 
jointly owned home was no longer presumed to belong to a hus-
band rather than a wife, a married woman's separate property in-
cluded earnings acquired from employment not carried on sepa-
rately from her husband, and the contributory negligence of one's 
spouse was not a bar to a negligence action. However, the evolution 
of married women's property rights in British Columbia occurred 
slowly; substantive progress was not achieved until more than fifty 
years after the first egalitarian legislation was passed. 
II. ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN 
1. Married Women's Property Legislation in the North-West 
Territories 
The present-day provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan were, until 
190 5, part of an immense area originally called the North-West 
Territories. The Hudson's Bay Company was considered to have 
"owned" all of this area, as well as a great deal of the rest of British 
North America, beginning in the early 1600s. In 1869, Prime 
Minister Macdonald concluded an agreement with the Hudson's 
Bay Company, under which the company was to receive a cash 
payment in return for most of the land. Canada attempted to take 
over these lands, without consulting the 11,500 Metis settlers in 
72 Brooksv. B.C. Electric Railway, [1919] 3 W.W.R. 109 (B.C. S.C.C.A.). 
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Red River, which was the location of the rebellion led by Louis Riel 
which lasted throughout the winter of 1869-1870 and later to be-
come Manitoba. After order was restored, the prairies were legally 
transferred to Canada in 1870. 
The Manitoba Act of 187073 defined the boundaries of the 
province of Manitoba, which was at that time much smaller than its 
present size. The act also created the North-West Territories, which 
included the remaining land of western Canada and the territory 
north of the then smaller provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Canada 
now extended from Halifax to the Rockies. 
The Canadian government took three major steps in anticipa-
tion of a rush of settlers to the North-West Territories.74 First, 
surveyors were sent out to sub-divide the prairies into sections; pre-
sent-day Alberta and Saskatchewan were divided into the districts 
of Alberta, Assiniboia, Athabasca, and Saskatchewan. Second, poli-
cies were adopted to enable prospective farmers to obtain parcels of 
land. The last task of the federal government was to create the po-
litical framework to take care of the needs of settlers, to which end 
the North- West Territories Act of 187575 was enacted. 
This legislation provided for the appointment of a lieutenant-
governor and a five-person council. The North- West Territories Act 
also affected the legal capacity and status of married women, 
modifying the English common law adopted in the North-West 
Territories as it had stood in 1870. The federal government appar-
ently did not think it necessary to enact first-wave style legislation 
to deal with the problem of deserted wives. Instead, the provisions 
of the North-West Territories Act, 1875, which pertained to women 
duplicated the 1873 British Columbian Married Womens Property 
Act, which had been largely borrowed from the 1872 Ontario legis-
lation.76 The Act did not give women separate property rights over 
personal property, but rather section 48 enabled them to hold any 
real estate owned or acquired during marriage to their own separate 
use. 
73 Manitoba Act, 33 Viet. (1870), c. 3. 
74 J. MacGregor, A History of Alberta (Edmonton: John Deyell Co., 1981) at 
114. 
75 An Act to amend and Consolidate the Laws respecting the North-West 
Territories Act, 38 Viet. (1875), c.49 [hereinafter North-West Territories Act 1875]. 
76 The North-West Territories Act 1875 omitted the provisions in the British 
Columbia and Ontario legislation concerning life insurance and stock-holding. 
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Section 49 defined "separate property" as earnings, profits from 
a separate occupation or skill, and acquisitions or investments pur-
chased with this money. Section 50 gave married women the right 
to have their own independent bank accounts, subject to the proviso 
in section 51 that any deposits of the husband's money made in 
fraud of his creditors could be followed. Husbands ceased to be li-
able, by virtue of section 52, for their wives' pre-nuptial debts and 
ante-nuptial debts incurred through their own separate employment 
or business. Instead, property belonging to the wife for her separate 
use became subject to the satisfaction of these debts. Section 53 
granted a married woman the right to maintain an action in her 
own name, and stated once again that a married woman could be 
sued separately from her husband in respect of her separate prop-
erty for her separate debts, engagements, contracts, or torts, as if 
she were unmarried. 
Married women's legal status as defined by this statute was later 
modified by the 1886 Territories Real Property Act,77 which estab-
lished a Torrens system of tide registration in order to facilitate ef-
ficient land transfer. The Act abolished dower and curtesy, which 
had imposed invisible encumbrances on tides and were therefore in-
consistent with a land registration system. Although the abolition is 
sometimes characterized as a regressive step in the evolution of 
married women's property rights,78 the extent to which the right of 
dower actually existed in the West is open to debate.79 Section 13 
effectively repealed section 48 of the North- West Territories Act 
18 75, so by providing that 
A married woman shall, in respect of land acquired by 
her after the coming into force of this Act, have all the 
rights and be subject to all the liabilities of a fame sole, 
and may alienate and, by will or otherwise, deal with 
land as if she were unmarried. 
77 Territories Real Property Act, S.C. 49 Viet. (1886) c. 26, ss. 8, 9, 13. 
78 J. Urse!, Private Lives, Public Policy: JOO Years of State Intervention in the 
Family (Toronto: Women's Press, 1992) at 103. 
79 M.A. Wilkinson & R. E. Hawkins, "The Abolition of Dower in Western 
Canada: How the Early Law Reform Process Failed Pioneer Women" (Faculty of 
Law, University of Western Ontario, 1993) [unpublished] at 7. 
80 North-West Territories Act 1875, supra note 75, s. 48. This Act was 
consolidated in S.C. 43 Viet. (1880), c. 25, s. 57. 
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Since the purpose of the statute was to introduce a Torrens system, 
it may be safe to surmise that this provision was merely an attempt 
to avoid clouded titles, rather than to grant further property rights 
to married women. Certainly the prevailing attitude to marriage at 
the time was that it was a working partnership based on equal con-
tributions, but with the husband as the head of the producing unit. 
As one pioneer woman remembers, 
My parents were equal partners always. There was no 
feeling that women were inferior as far as our dad was 
concerned .... I think perhaps they taught us leadership 
for men, but they never made any difference between 
male and female otherwise. But they expected a man to 
take the lead. It didn't mal<e the woman an inferior being 
as far as my family was concerned. God meant them to 
work together. 81 
The judiciary appear to have subscribed to a similar opinion. 
Despite the fact that section 13 could be interpreted to extend 
married women's property rights beyond the right merely to hold 
property to "separate" use, it was not until 1924 that the Supreme 
Court of Alberta reassessed the impact of section 13 and declared 
that it conferred the right to own "individual" property. This case 
will be discussed below. 82 
The four sections from the North-West Territories Act 1875, 
which remained were carried forward in the North-West Territories 
Acts of 1880 and 1886.83 The territorial government was granted 
the power to legislate in respect to property and civil rights when it 
became part of Canada in 1875; however, aside from minor 
changes brought about by territorial ordinances, the laws relating to 
married women's property changed little before Alberta and 
Saskatchewan became provinces in 1905. Therefore, judicial inter-
pretation over the next fifty years can be analyzed in comparison to 
SI E. L. Silverman, The Last Best West: Women on the Alberta Frontier 1880-
1930 (Montreal: Eden Press, 1984) at 56. 
82 See text accompanying note 113. 
83 North-West Territories Act, S.C. 43 Viet. (1880), c. 25, ss. 57-62 [hereinafter 
North-West Territories Act 1880]; North-West Territories Act S.C 49 Viet. (1886), 
c. 50, ss. 36-40 [hereinafter North-West Territories Act 1886]. 
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the static template of the four provisions in the North- West 
Territories Act 1875. 84 
The Territories first exercised their jurisdiction to legislate in 
relation to married women's property rights in 1886. An Ordinance 
to Facilitate the Conveyance of Real Estate by Married Women85 
granted a married woman the right to convey her real estate as fully 
and effectively as if she were a fame sole, with no requirement that 
this real estate be "separate" property. However, since this legal 
right had already been granted by the federal North- West 
Territories Act 1875, the statute did not change the existing law. 
2. Case Law in the North-West Territories 
i. The Scope of Separate Property 
Three years after the Ordinance was enacted, the first legal issue 
concerning married women's property rights came before the 
North-West Territories courts. In 1889, the case of Brittlebank v. 
Gray-Jones 86 required determination of the scope of "separate 
property" in section 49 of the North-West Territories Act 1875, 87 
which provided that 
All the wages and personal earnings of a married woman, 
and any acquisitions therefrom, and all proceeds or prof-
its from any occupation or trade which she carries on 
separately from her husband, or derived from any liter-
ary, artistic or scientific skill, and all investments of such 
wages, earnings, moneys or property, shall hereafter be 
free from the debts or dispositions of the husband, and 
shall be held and enjoyed by such married woman, and 
disposed of without her husband's consent, as fully as if 
she were a fame sole, and no order for protection shall 
hereafter become necessary in respect of any such earn-
ings or acquisitions; and the possession, whether actual or 
84 Since the provisions in the North-West Territories Act, 1875, were not 
amended in any way from 1875 to 1886, for the purpose of convenience they will be 
referred to throughout by their original numbers. 
85 An Ordinance to Facilitate the Conveyance of Real Estate by Married Women 
(N.W.T.), No. 6, 1886. 
86 Brittlebank v. Gray-Jones (1888), 5 M.L.R. 33, (1887), 1 Terr LR. 70 (Man. 
Ct. QB.). 
87 The Court considered the equivalent of s. 49, which was North- West 
Territories Act 1880, supra note 83, s. 57. 
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constructive, of the husband, of any personal property of 
any married woman, shall not render the same liable for 
his debts. 
The defendant, Mrs. Gray-Jones, had money settled upon her 
to her own separate use by her marriage settlement in England. In 
1883 she went to the North-West Territories, bought a farm, and 
began to live on it. Her husband was carrying on business in 
Winnipeg at this time. In the spring of 1884, Mrs. Gray-Jones 
bought farm stock including horses, cattle, and pigs. Her husband 
then came to live with her on the farm, and according to the find-
ings of fact, it was he who carried on the farming operations. The 
farm stock were later seized under an execution order against the 
husband, and Mrs. Gray-Jones claimed them as her separate prop-
erty in an interpleader motion against the execution creditor. 
The decision of a magistrate in the North-West Territories that 
the right to hold separate property did not extend to general per-
sonal property was upheld by the Manitoba Queen's Bench, the ap-
peal court for the North-West Territories until 1887. The refer-
ences to "personal property" in section 49 and to "chattels" in sec-
tion 53 did not convince the Court that the legislature intended to 
bring about such a significant legal change. Professing themselves 
bound by the rule of interpretation that a statute that is a departure 
from the common law must be construed narrowly, the Court held 
that a married woman's separate personal property only included 
earnings and personal property used for carrying on a separate trade 
or business. Since Mr. Gray-Jones carried on the farming, the live-
stock did not constitute "separate" property, but merely personal 
property. The husband therefore was the owner on the basis that, at 
common law, any personal property bought by a married woman 
immediately became the property of her husband by way of an ab-
solute legal gift. The Court relied on English authority for this 
common law rule, which had also been utilized in Ontario since 
1860 to neutralize the effect of that jurisdiction's married women's 
property legislation. 88 
The territorial government may have been responding to this 
judicial obstinance in passing An Ordinance Respecting the Personal 
Property of Married Women 89 the year after Brittlebank v. Gray-
88 Kraemerv. Gless (1860), 10 U.C.C.P 470. 
89 An Ordinance Respecting the Personal Property of Married Women, Ord. no. 
16of1889 (N.W.T.) [hereinafter Ordinance of 1889]. 
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Jones was decided. This ordinance explicitly extended property 
rights to include personal property: 
A married woman shall, in respect of her personal prop-
erty, have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities 
of a fame sole and may alienate and by will, or otherwise, 
deal with personal property, as if she were unmarried .... 
A literal reading of the provision indicates that the legislature in-
tended to bring about a significant expansion of the scope married 
women's property rights. One author has speculated that such egali-
tarian legislation was passed because the harshness of pioneering 
conditions, in which wives "struggled shoulder to shoulder with 
their husbands on the untamed land in the harshness of frontier 
life," made it obvious that depriving a wife of all rights in respect of 
property held by her husband was inequitable.9° 
If it is true that this discovery influenced the legislature, the in-
equity was certainly not as obvious to the judiciary. The Ordinance 
did not define what constituted separate property, but the fact that 
it made reference to "her" personal property was considered de-
terminative by the North-West Territories Court of Appeal in 
Conger v. Kennedy, decided in 1895.91 The case concerned the 
ownership of furniture which had belonged to Mrs. Conger before 
her marriage. While her husband was still living, Mrs. Conger exe-
cuted a bill of sale whereby she assigned and conveyed the goods in 
question to her son. After her husband's death, the administrator of 
the husband's estate took possession of the furniture, and Mrs. 
Conger's son claimed the goods. 
The Court considered whether the Ordinance of 1889 broad-
ened the scope of married women's rights over personal property. 
As in Brittlebank v. Gray-Jones , the Court adhered to the principle 
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed 
strictly. As a result, the mere presence of the word "her" in the 
Ordinance was not strong enough to abrogate the common law rule 
that a woman's personal property passed by way of gift to her hus-
band upon marriage. The Court followed the rule from Brittlebank 
v. Gray-Jones that the words "her personal property" are intended to 
90 0. M. Stone, "Canadian Women as Legal Persons: How Alberta combined 
Judicial, Executive and Legislative powers to win full legal personality for all 
Canadian women" (1979) 17 Alta. L. Rev. 331at347-8. 
9l Congerv. Kennedy, (1895) 2 Terr. L. R. 186, rev'd (1896) 26 S.C.R. 397. 
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refer only to particular types of property defined in section 49 of 
the North-West Territories Act 1875, namely, separate earnings. 
Since the Court felt compelled to interpret the Ordinance as having 
changed the law in some way, they stated that it modified a mar-
ried woman's rights and liabilities in respect of an unchanged defi-
nition of personal property from the North- West Territories Act 
1875. 
Although the court professed to be merely applying the law 
from Brittlebank v. Gray-Jones, in fact, the Court of Appeal's deci-
sion in Conger v. Kennedy was considerably more unjust. In 
Brittlebank v. Gray-Jones, goods bought with money owned sepa-
rately by a married woman became the property of her husband on 
the basis that he took part in the farming operations. In contrast, 
Mrs. and Mr. Conger were not involved in any joint business ven-
ture; she lost the ownership rights to her furniture purely on the ba-
sis of the legal effects of marriage. Moreover, the words "her per-
sonal property" in the Ordinance of 1889 were not ambiguous, and 
indicate quite unequivocally that it was the intent of the legislature 
that the law be expanded. 
Justice Wetmore dissented. He was of the opinion that the 
Legislature must have had some objective in passing the Ordinance, 
and could not have merely intended to give property rights that 
had already been granted by the North-West Territories Act 1875. 
He placed importance on the word "all" in the phrase "all the rights 
and liabilities of a fame sole," interpreting the rights of a fame sole to 
be those of acquiring, holding, and disposing of property. Relying 
on a common sense approach to interpreting the words "her per-
sonal property,'' he held that 
I have no moral doubt ... that the legislature intended to 
make all personal property of every description that a 
married woman had at the time of her marriage, or 
which might come to her after marriage, her own to be 
enjoyed, used and disposed of as a fame sole could enjoy, 
use and dispose of it. 92 
Justice Wetmore's approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada when it decided the case on appeal in 1896. The court did 
not reverse Brittlebank v. Gray-Jones; in fact, the court affirmed that 
section 49 of the North-West Territories Act 1875, only granted 
92 (1895) 2 Terr. L. R. 186 at 196. 
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married women control over their earnings and did not extend to 
their personal property. However, the Ordinance of 1889 had 
changed the law. The Court held that the words "her personal 
property" in the Ordinance were not limited to separate property as 
defined in the North- West Territories Act 1875, but extended to all 
of a married woman's personal property. The rationale for this 
conclusion was that the legislature must be presumed to have in-
tended some alteration of the law so far as is consistent with the 
language of the Act. 
This decision was followed in Harvey v. Silzer 93 in 1905 in 
chambers. In this case, wheat grown on the claimant's farm was 
seized by her husband's creditors. Both parties had considered the 
farm to belong to the wife, although the husband occasionally did 
farm work for her without being paid for his services. The wife 
owned the land, directed the work on it, and resided on it sepa-
rately from her husband, who had his own homestead. She bought 
implements and horses jointly with her husband from the proceeds 
of the farm, paid for the threshing, and had her brother-in-law and 
her son do most of the work. Despite all this, the fact that the 
woman was not adequately supported by her alcoholic husband was 
apparently as important a factor as any other: 
I do not think that the husband was working this land as 
the tenant of his wife or the head of his family, but that 
whatever work he did was under her direction, that the 
farm was worked by her for the maintenance of herself 
and family, on account of the drinking habits of her hus-
band, who evidently did not provide sufficiently for the 
family. 94 
The philosophy of protecting deserving wives deserted by their 
husbands appears to have been at least partially motivating the 
Judge's decision. Paternalism aside, Harvey v. Silzer established the 
rule subsequently adopted in Alberta and Saskatchewan that crops 
grown on land owned by a married woman, on which both she and 
her husband reside, prima facie belong to her and should only be 
found to be the husband's property when it is shown that he carried 
on the farming operations as the head of the family or as tenant of 
the land. After 1905, a woman enjoyed all the rights of a feme sole, 
93 Harvey v. Silzer (1905), 1 W.L.R. 360 (N.W.T. Chambers). 
94 Ibid. at 362. 
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not only to her land but also to the crops raised on it, unless her 
husband was the principal farmer. 
ii. Rights Over Property in the North-West Territories 
In contrast to their restrictive conception of separate property, the 
judges in the North-West Territories were expansive in assessing the 
rights and liabilities of married women. The right to dispose of 
property was enlarged in Brooks v. Brooks et al., 95 decided in 1896. 
In interpreting the effect of the Ordinance of 1890, 96 Justice 
Richardson rejected the common law principle that upon marriage 
a woman's personal chattels passed by way of gift to her husband 
and she thereafter did not have the power to dispose of them. 
However, the Judge expressed some reluctance in reaching his de-
c1s1on: 
But whether or not the Legislature has wisely ordained, 
they have so extended the right of married women over 
separate personal property as to give the wife the jus 
disponendi of it, in my humble opinion, by virtue of 
Ordinance 20 of 1890, when the wife here attained all 
the rights in respect thereof of a fame sole. 97 
In the result, the defendant married woman had the right to alien-
ate cattle derived from her occupation of cattle raising, which she 
carried on separately from her husband. Since the Supreme Court 
of Canada had decided in Conger v. Kennedy that "separate prop-
erty" also included personal property, as of 1896 in the North-West 
Territories personal property ceased to pass automatically to hus-
bands on marriage, and women enjoyed jus disponendi over their 
belongings. 
iii. The Scope of Liability of Married Women in the North- West 
Territories 
The first North-West Territories case to expand the liability of 
married women from their protected status at common law was 
95 Brooks v. Brooks et. al. (1896), 2 Terr LR. 289 (S.C.T.D.). 
96An Ordinance Respecting the Personal Property of Married Women, Ord. no. 20 
of 1890 (N.W.T.), consolidated in C.O.N.W.T. (1898), c. 47 [hereinafter 
Ordinance of 1890]. Note that the Ordinance of 1890 repealed the Ordinance of 
1889. 
97Supra, note 95 at 293. 
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Harris v. Harris, 98 in 1895. The decision was delivered by Justice 
Wetmore, who had been the dissenting voice in the North-West 
Territories Court of Appeal in Conger v. Kennedy. In deciding 
whether a married woman's liability was so broad that she should 
have to pay costs in an action she launched against her husband, 
Justice Wetmore relied on English precedents to support his con-
clusion that the Ordinance of 1890 rendered a husband and wife "in 
the same position as two men" formerly were. Justice Wetmore 
justified his reliance on the English law on the basis that even 
though the language differed, the effect of the said Ordinance was 
the same as the English Married Womens Property Act of 1882. In 
the result, the plaintiff was responsible for paying the costs of her 
dismissed action for alimony out of her separate property. 
A second case on this topic was decided in 1901 by Justice 
Richardson, who had rendered the decision in Brooks v. Brooks in 
1896. As in Brooks v. Brooks, Justice Richardson was asked to con-
sider the effect of the Ordinance of 1890. The plaintiff, Mr. 
England, was suing his wife for rights to a house and furniture. Both 
spouses claimed ownership of the property, and Mrs. England fur-
ther claimed that because plaintiff and defendant were "man and 
wife," the action was not maintainable.99 Justice Richardson based 
his decision as to whether a husband could sue his wife on an 
English legal text, and held that in respect of personal property a 
woman suffered no legal incapacity whatsoever and was subject to 
all the liabilities of a fame sole. Therefore, where real or personal 
property was in dispute between a husband and wife, the wife was 
liable to be sued just as if she were not married. 
3. Case Law in Alberta and Saskatchewan 
Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces in 1905. During the 
next three decades, the right of married prairie women to control 
their property was significantly expanded. The judges in Alberta 
and Saskatchewan began to construe the legislation less narrowly, 
and by the early 1920s most of the laws which had been stifled for 
years were given effect. The change in judicial attitude can be ex-
plained by the radical changes taking place from 1905 to the early 
1920s in many aspects of women's social status and legal rights. For 
98 Harrisv. Harris (1895), 3 Terr. L.R. 289 (Chambers). 
99 Englandv. England(1901), 5 Terr. L.R. 204 (S.C.T.D.). 
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example, the expansion of property rights took place in a period 
when the public and women's groups were lobbying to secure wom-
en's rights to an interest in the family home based on the common 
law right of dower. 100 As well, the extension of the right to vote to 
women in Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1916 likely had an impact 
upon the judiciary's determination of the appropriate scope of 
women's property rights. An overview of the case law reveals the 
evolving attitudes of the judges in Alberta and Saskatchewan during 
this period. 
i. The Scope of Separate Property 
Despite the clear direction from the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Conger v. Kennedy, judges in Alberta and Saskatchewan were reluc-
tant to abandon a narrow definition of "separate estate." In Fraser v. 
Kirkpatrick, decided in 1907,101 the Trial Division of the Alberta 
Supreme Court had to decide whether profits of a business in which 
a husband played some role constituted the wife's "separate prop-
erty." The husband of the defendant, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, became in-
solvent in 1901. At about that time, presumably to secure an in-
come for the household, Mrs. Kirkpatrick began working as a 
housekeeper. She subsequently leased a hotel, obtained a license, 
and carried on a hotel business in her name, with her husband assist-
ing her in the business. Three years later, Mrs. Kirkpatrick became a 
partner in a real estate business. She used the money she had made 
in the hotel business to make a number of profitable investments. 
At that point, execution creditors obtained a judgment against 
the husband in relation to a debt that he incurred before he became 
insolvent in 190 l, and took action to realize their judgment. The 
Court therefore had to determine whether the profits acquired 
from the hotel business were the property of the husband, or if they 
became the separate personal property of Mrs. Kirkpatrick under 
Ordinance of 1890, which stated: 
A married woman shall, in respect of personal property, 
be under no disabilities whatsoever heretofore existing by 
100 A public campaign for dower law, which was supported by a number of 
women's organizations, culminated in legislation in all three of the western 
provinces by 1920. See M. McCallum, Prairie Women and the Struggle for Dower 
Law, 1905-1920 (Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, 1992) [unpublished] at 
3. 
IOI Fraserv. Kirkpatrick (1907), 5 W.L.R. 581(Alta. S.C.T.D.) 
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reason of her coverture or otherwise, but shall, in respect 
of the same, have all the rights and be subject to all the li-
abilities of a fame sole .102 
The Trial Judge reasoned that although the North-West Territories 
legislature did not have the jurisdiction to repeal or restrict the 
North- West Territories Act, they could have explicitly extended the 
law by drafting the Ordinance to state that all the earnings of a 
woman acquired in any way, whether in a business carried on by her 
apart from her husband or one in which a husband takes part, 
would be her separate property. Since the legislators did not explic-
itly do that, the Judge felt that the words of section 49, which pro-
vided that earnings were only separate personal property if acquired 
in a business carried on separately from one's husband, restricted 
women's property rights to earnings made in a manner which was 
absolutely and completely separate from their husbands. The exe-
cution creditors were able to enforce their claim against the hus-
band and seize this property. 
This result was fundamentally at odds with the law from the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Conger v. Kennedy, which held that 
the scope of separate property was not limited to the definition 
provided in the North-West Territories Act. The Trial Judge distin-
guished the Supreme Court ruling on the basis that it did not con-
cern the definition of separate property, but instead only deter-
mined the rights of a woman over her personal property upon mar-
riage, 103 despite the fact that the Chief Justice had clearly stated in 
Conger v. Kennedy that 
the words "her personal property" unconfined by any 
context, must be interpreted as having reference to all the 
personal property belonging to a married woman .... 
This is the plain prima facie meaning of the words in 
question taken in their ordinary sense, from which we 
have no authority to depart. 104 
Even as late as 1907, therefore, the rights of married women in 
Alberta to control their property only extended to separate prop-
erty, and separate property continued to be defined extremely nar-
rowly. 
102 Supra note 96. 
103 Fraser v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 101 at 583. 
104 Supra note 91 at 404. 
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The courts in Saskatchewan had numerous opportunities to de-
cide whether the proceeds of a married woman's occupation were 
her separate property, since crops grown on land owned by married 
women were often seized by their husbands' creditors. Crops were 
generally the asset under dispute in the prairie provinces, rather than 
chattels as in British Columbia and Ontario. Courts in the early 
1900s continued to follow the Harvey v. Silzer rule from the North-
West Territories that when crops are grown on land owned by a 
married woman, on which both she and her husband reside, the 
crops prima facie belong to her, and should only be found to be the 
husband's property when it was shown that he carried on the farm-
ing operations as the head of the family or as tenant of the land. 105 
After becoming a judge in the province of Saskatchewan, Justice 
Wetmore continued the liberal approach he had adopted on the 
bench in the North-West Territories. In 1910, he outlined the 
Harvey v. Selzer rule and stated in obiter: 
Now, I agree with that only I do not wish to be under-
stood as holding that if the husband carried on farming 
operations upon such land merely as the wife's manager, 
it would deprive her of the rights to her property, or to 
the proceeds of that property. 106 
Thus Justice Wetmore gave support for an expansion of the scope 
of separate property even to assets acquired through farming opera-
tions in which a husband operated as his wife's manager. 
The magnanimity of the Saskatchewan judiciary to the scope of 
separate property was illustrated yet again in 1923, when the Court 
of Appeal held that a car bought with money realized from the sale 
of crops prima facie belonged to the married woman who owned 
the land, despite the fact that her husband carried on the farming 
operations, and that the burden fell on the other party to show that 
the husband farmed as the head of the family or as a tenant. 107 
It is somewhat surprising that there are no reported cases in the 
three most western provinces in which a business woman was sued 
by her own creditors seeking to prove that assets were her separate 
property and therefore liable to satisfy debts she had incurred. It 
I05 This case was followed in Saskatchewan in Lindsay v. Morrow (1908), 1 Sask 
L.R. 516; Moose Mountain Lumber and Hardware Co. v. Hunter et al. (1911), 3 
Sask LR. 89, andMinakerv. Hadden, [1917] 3 W.W.R. 774. 
106 Karstv. Cook and Tait (1910), 3 Sask L.R. 406 at 411 (S.C.T.D.). 
I07 Pierce v. Thompson et. al [1921] 3 W.W.R. 573 (Sask. S.C.C.A.). 
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would have been to an individual business woman's advantage to 
rely upon the narrow definition of separate property which the ju-
diciary had traditionally maintained. For example, she could argue 
that her husband had some hand in the business, so that it was not a 
"separate" occupation. Or, as did a woman in Manitoba in 1884, 
she could contract for goods to run her business and then avoid li-
ability by arguing that she could only be held liable to the extent of 
her separate property. 108 Whether or not any individual women 
benefited from the narrow judicial interpretations in this way is un-
clear. It can be inferred, however, that the decisions which narrowly 
defined separate property had a detrimental effect upon the eco-
nomic status of married women as a whole in the prairies, since, as 
discussed above, their continued legal disabilities would have im-
peded their ability to secure credit and enter into contracts. 
Unfortunately, the full impact of this legal and economic disability 
in Alberta and Saskatchewan is not clear. 
ii. Rights of Married Women to Own Property in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan 
As late as 1922 in Alberta, the common law concerning the right of 
a married woman to sue for a tort inflicted upon her had not been 
altered by statute. Therefore, it was necessary that her husband be 
joined in any such action. Some hope for change was given by the 
Trial Judge in Bennettv. Edmonton. 109 A recent Alberta case had 
held that the courts of Alberta were not strictly bound by the deci-
sions of English courts as to the state of the common law of 
England in 1870.110 On that basis, the Trial Judge questioned in 
obiter whether under the common law of Alberta as of that date it 
was still necessary for the husband to be joined, but determining 
this issue was not necessary to decide the case. 
iii. Liability of Married Women in Alberta and Saskatchewan 
The doctrine of marital unity continued to provide protection for 
married women in the prairies until at least 1918, when Gaetz v. 
Jarvis 111 was decided. The common law presumption that a married 
108 Wishartv. McManus (1884), 1 M.L.R. 213 (Q.B.). 
109 Bennettv. Edmonton, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 861 (Alta. S.C.T.D.). 
110 Rexv. Cyr, [1917] 2 W.W.R. 1185 (Alta. S.C.A.D.). 
111 Gaetzv.]arvis, [1918] 3 W.W.R. 888 (Alta. Dist. Ct.). 
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woman acts as agent for her husband when purchasing necessaries 
convinced the District Court Judge in this case that the defendant 
married woman would not be held personally liable for contracts 
into which she had entered. 
However, by 1929 the Alberta judiciary had abandoned the 
doctrine of marital unity so completely that a married woman 
could now be sued by her husband for debts she owed to him. In 
Haugen v. Haugen, 112 the Court relied upon English case law in-
terpreting that jurisdiction's Married Woman's Property Act and 
held that a husband could launch a claim against his wife for debts 
arising after the marriage. However, the common law rule survived 
that a husband could not recover from his wife a debt contracted 
before their marriage. Therefore a mechanic's lien filed by him be-
fore the marriage in respect of such a debt was held to be ineffective 
after the marriage. 
iv. Liability of Husbands in Alberta and Saskatchewan 
The two issues of the scope of married women's rights to separate 
property and the liability of husbands for their wives' torts under 
the North-West Territories Act 1875, were still contentious fifty 
years after the provisions were first enacted. When the question 
arose in Saskatchewan, the judges failed to even turn their minds to 
whether the North- West Territories Act had reduced the extent to 
which husbands were liable for their wives' torts. Although 
Saskatchewan passed a Married Women's Property Act 113 in 1907, 
the statute did not change the existing law. The Trial Judge in the 
1915 case of Hahn v. Gettel 114 summarily applied the common law 
rule that husbands were responsible for the torts of their wives, 
without any consideration of whether this common law rule had 
been abrogated by legislation. 
In stark contrast is the Alberta Supreme Court Appeal 
Division's approach in the 1924 case of Quinn v. Beales. 11 5 Section 
53 of the North-West Territories Act was relied upon by the plain-
tiff, claimed to have been the victim of the tort of slander, to argue 
that women's property rights were limited to "separate estate" and 
that this by implication meant that the husband was still jointly li-
112 Haugen v. Haugen (1929), 3 D.L.R. 16 (Alta. S.C.T.D.). 
113 Married Womens Property Act, R.S.S. 1909, c. 45. 
114 Hahn v. Gettel (1915), 9 W.W.R. 686 (Sask. S.C.T.D.). 
115 [1924] 3 W.W.R. 337 (Alta., S.C.A.D.). 
210 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
able for the torts of his wife. The Alberta Court of Appeal chose not 
to follow the English rule that notwithstanding equivalent English 
provisions, the husband was still a proper party in an action against 
the wife for her separate tort and a judgment could be given against 
both of them. 
The Court surveyed the evolution of the law in the North-West 
Territories relating to the liability of husbands for the actions of 
their wives, and the rights of married women to hold property. At 
common law, as adopted in 1870 in the Territories, a husband was 
not liable for his wife's torts, in the sense that he could not be sued 
directly for them. However, he could be held liable if he was made 
a party in an action against her during the marriage. As described 
above, section 52 of the North-West Territories Act modified the 
law by providing that a husband would not be liable for his wife's 
ante-nuptial debts or any debts contracted during marriage in any 
business of her own. Section 53 provided that a married woman 
could sue or be sued separately from her husband for her separate 
debts, contracts or torts as if she were unmarried. 11 6 
As noted, the law had been amended yet again in 1886 by sec-
tion 13 of the North- West Territories Real Property Act, which made 
no reference to "separate" property, and instead gave married 
women all the rights of a fame sole with respect to land. The Court 
reasoned that this section nullified the limitation of women's prop-
erty rights to separate property, and in fact, separate property in the 
historical sense no longer existed. Therefore, all subsequent refer-
ences to "separate" property would be interpreted to mean 
"individual" property. In the Court's view, from 1886, a married 
woman had the same degree of control over her property as did a 
married man over his. 
As a result, after 1886, the federal government had no need to 
pass the re-statements of section 53 in subsequent enactments of the 
North-West Territories Act. The basis of section 53, which enabled a 
married woman to sue and be sued, was the continued existence of 
separate estate. Since separate estate had ceased to exist, the provi-
sion was no longer necessary, and therefore could not be said to 
continue to restrict a married woman's liability to her separate 
debts, contracts and torts. Instead, a married woman had become 
fully liable for any claims against her, whether or not she was pos-
116 Section 53 of the North-West Territories Act 1875 was re-numbered in the 
North-West Territories Act 1886 as s. 40. 
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sessed of property in her own right. The Court held that the impli-
cation of that finding was that the common law liability of a hus-
band for his wife's torts had been abrogated.II? 
Based on these conclusions about the effect of section 13 of the 
1886 Real Property Act, the Alberta Married Women Property Act 118 
was also held to be redundant. This legislation, passed in 1922, was 
the first statute passed by the province of Alberta relating to 
married women's property. Section 2 of the act provided that: 
A married woman shall be capable of acquiring, holding 
and disposing of or otherwise dealing with all classes of 
real and personal property, and of contracting, suing and 
being sued in any form of action or prosecution as if she 
were an unmarried woman. 
The Court concluded that this legislation merely declared the law 
that existed at the time it was enacted. 
Thus, at long last, by force of a statute passed in 1886, in 1924 
the married women of Alberta had gained the right to own 
"individual" rather than merely separate property. They also be-
came legally responsible for their own torts, a development which 
had not yet occurred in British Columbia. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The process of reform of married women's property law was re-
markably similar across the western provinces. Although the colony 
of British Columbia was one of the first jurisdictions in the country 
to enact legislation, a reluctance on the part of the judiciary in that 
province to construe married women's property laws broadly en-
sured that significant change to women's legal status did not take 
place until the early twentieth century. Similarly, the judges in the 
North-West Territories, and later in Saskatchewan and Alberta, re-
sisted participating in the dismantling of the institution of marital 
unity. 
Married women's property reform in Canada has been ex-
plained as an effort by the state to restructure patriarchy to fit new 
I 17 See Quinn v. Beales, Supra note 115 at 346. 
118 An Act Respecting the Rights and Property of Married Women, R.S.A. 1922, 
c. 214 [hereinafter Married Women's Property Act 1922]. 
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industrial economies. 11 9 The fact that the British Columbian 
economy was largely industrial may partly explain why legislative 
and substantive change followed a similar course to that in central 
Canada. However, it is less simple to explain why the agricultural 
economy of the prairies did not translate into an earlier judicial ac-
ceptance of the statutory property rights of married women. It may 
be that the belief that a greater acknowledgment of the value of 
women's work in an agricultural economy should lead to greater 
property rights is an inappropriately modern assumption. Women 
in the prairies may not have desired a restructuring of their property 
rights, if the important role they played in the survival of their 
families translated into equal power and control over family assets. 
Of course, even if it is true that women were considered equal part-
ners in the marital unit, the common law imposed hardships upon 
those women who left their husbands, or were left by them, and 
those who wanted to participate in commercial activities. These 
women were presumably numerically in the minority. 
Although the original focus of legislative reform in the west was 
assisting deserted women, subsequent legislation appears to have 
been designed largely to rationalize debtor-creditor relations. It 
must be acknowledged that a number of other factors likely con-
tributed to the conviction on the part of the legislatures that change 
was necessary. Evolving attitudes about the roles of women, a desire 
to codify the law, and concern for the plight of families in times of 
economic instability played a part in the statutory reform. 
However, the fact remains that the issues most often arising under 
the statutes involved disputes between creditors and debtors rather 
than disputes between husbands and wives. Apparently, reforming 
the legal relationship between spouses was of more concern to credi-
tors than it was to married women and men. 
The resistance of the judges in all three provinces to give effect 
to the laws was based upon an adherence to the traditional notion 
of the family as a unit or "community." Recognition of the separate 
property interests of women or of contractual relationships between 
spouses was rejected as a threat to that institution. The pattern of 
judicial resistance in the west to modification of the marital rela-
tionship in the face of incremental change from the legislatures may 
be a result of the different roles played by these two bodies. The 
119 This idea is explored in Urse!, supra note 78 at 123. 
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laws delineating the property within a creditor's reach were in need 
of reform from a politician or business-person's point of view, both 
in the industrial economy of British Columbia and in the agricul-
tural provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. In contrast, these con-
cerns were of little consequence to the judiciary, which was under 
less pressure to respond to social and economic change. However, 
by the end of the 1920s, the extent to which the legal and social 
position of women had been transformed convinced the judiciary 
that the doctrine of marital unity did not reflect reality. For better 
or for worse, married women had gained the right to control, dis-
pose of, and be sued for all of their real and personal property. 
